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STATE OF IDAHO,
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NO. 46536-2018
BONNER COUNTY NO. CR-2017-457

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Foster pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder, with one enhancement for the
infliction of great bodily injury. The district court imposed two consecutive sentences of 25
years, each with 12.5 years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Foster asserts the district court abused its
discretion by imposing excessive sentences.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On January 10, 2016, Bonner County Sheriffs deputies responded to a home in
Blanchard, Idaho after a report of a domestic dispute. (Presentence Investigation Report (PSI),
p.94.) 1 Mr. Foster's mother, Audrey, called law enforcement and stated she felt threatened by
Mr. Foster, who was living with her at the time. (PSI, p.94.) Audrey said Mr. Foster was not
stable and had "got in her face and shoved her with his chest." (PSI, p.94.) She also said he had
threatened to kill her and law enforcement officers if she called 911, and he sometimes carried a
gun. (PSI, p.94.) When sheriffs deputies arrived at the house, Mr. Foster came out of the house
but immediately went back inside after refusing to show his hands or speak with the officers
about the incident with Audrey.

(PSI, p.94.)

Given the potentially volatile nature of the

situation, the deputies decided to leave and get a warrant for Mr. Foster's arrest based on the
alleged battery. (PSI, p.94; Tr., p.129, Ls.5-24.)
Later that evening, Mr. Foster called Bonner County dispatch to report that "three guys
with guns" had come to his house. (PSI, p.94.) He said they were from the Pend Oreille County
Sheriffs office, and he feared for his life when they came to the house.

(PSI, p.94.) The

following day, Mr. Foster called dispatch and asked to speak with a deputy. (PSI, p.94.) One of
the deputies who had been at the house, Deputy Penn, answered the call and told Mr. Foster why
they had been at the house; Mr. Foster explained that he did not comply with their commands
because he was scared.

(PSI, pp.94-95.) Deputy Penn said that, during their conversation,

Mr. Foster accused him of lying or asking too many personal questions.
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(PSI, p.95.)

On

Citations to the PSI refer to the 235-page electronic document, which contains, among other
things, the two LC. § 18-211 evaluations performed by Dr. Philip Hanger-Defendant's Exhibits
AandB.
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January 12, 2016, Deputy Penn, applied for an arrest warrant for Mr. Foster, and the magistrate
court issued the warrant. (PSI, p.94; Confidential Exhibits, pp.2-7.) 2
One year later, the arrest warrant had still not been served. (Tr., p. 130, L.6 - p.131, L.4.)
Deputy Gagnon-the other deputy injured in this case-testified that, on January 9, 2017,
Audrey called the sheriffs office again to report that she was scared of her son and believed he
would try to kill any authorities who tried to arrest him. (Tr., p. 130, Ls.6-15.) Due to the threats
of violence, Deputy Gagnon spoke with a supervisor, and they decided not to serve the warrant at
that time because Mr. Foster was a recluse who had become "so paranoid he rarely left his
house."

(Tr., p.130, Ls.18-25)

Audrey stated that Mr. Foster was not a threat unless law

enforcement got involved, and she and Deputy Gagnon agreed there would be a safer
opportunity to arrest Mr. Foster when he was out of the house at some point. (Tr., p.131, Ls.424.)
However, Deputy Gagnon testified that Audrey called again, on January 16, 2017, and
said Mr. Foster's paranoia had worsened, and he was talking about killing their neighbors.
(Tr., p.132, Ls.3-9.) Therefore, she asked the deputies to come back to the house. (Tr., p.133,
Ls.20-21.) Deputy Gagnon said he called Deputy Penn to explain the situation, and they agreed
they needed to take action.

(Tr., p.133, Ls.1-8.)

When the deputies arrived at the house,

Mr. Foster was standing in the driveway, and the officers told him to put his hands above his
head because they knew he carried a handgun in his waist band. (Tr., p.136, Ls.6-9.) Mr. Foster
refused to comply with their commands, and he ultimately ran around the back of the house.
(Tr., p.136, Ls.10-13, p.138, Ls.16-17.) When the deputies ran after him, Mr. Foster shot them
as they rounded the corner of the house. (Tr., p.138, L.21 - p.139, L.1; see also State's Exhibit
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Citations to the "Confidential Exhibits" refer to the 55-page electronic document.
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1—Deputy Gagnon’s dash cam video recording.) Deputy Gagnon was shot three times, and
Deputy Penn was shot twice. (PSI, pp.95-96.) The deputies returned fire, and shot Mr. Foster,
but he made his way into the house. (PSI, p.95.) When backup officers arrived, Mr. Foster came
out of the front door and was arrested after he fell into a snowbank. (PSI, p.95.)
On February 3, 2017, Mr. Foster was evaluated pursuant to I.C. § 18-211. (PSI, pp.4049.) When asked about what happened at the house, he said he did not comprehend that the
deputies were legitimate law enforcement officers. (PSI, p.44.) He said he thought they “were
wearing jeans,” and he was “afraid they were going to take [him] into the woods and kill [him].
(PSI, p.44.) He said he heard them say, “Kill the Mexican,” which made him even more fearful.
(PSI, p.44.) During the evaluation, he continued to describe his delusions in the months leading
up to the shooting and said he thought the deputies were there to “harm me and my family.”
(PSI, p.44.)
The psychologist performing the evaluation, Dr. Hanger, determined that Mr. Foster did
“not possess an adequate understanding of the proceedings against him.”

(PSI, p.48.)

Additionally, he opined that Mr. Foster did not possess an adequate ability to assist his counsel in
his defense, and his “heightened distractibility, coupled with his delusional and disorganized
cognitive abilities significantly impair[ed] his capacity to make intelligent decisions regarding a
plea agreement.” (PSI, p.49.) When Mr. Foster was evaluated again on March 17, 2017,
Dr. Hanger reached the same conclusions. (PSI, pp.61-62.) After a competency hearing (see
Tr., pp.4-81), the magistrate judge entered an order for Mr. Foster’s commitment pursuant to
I.C. §§ 18-211 and 18-212. (R., pp.102-04.) When Mr. Foster was evaluated again in May of
2017, a different psychologist determined that he was not competent to stand trial. (PSI, pp.6566.) However, by July of 2017, he was deemed competent. (PSI, p.70.)
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After a preliminary hearing, Mr. Foster was bound over to the district court. (R., pp.14050.) Thereafter, the State charged Mr. Foster, by Information, with two counts of attempted
murder, two enhancements for inflicting great bodily injury, and two enhancements for the use of
a deadly weapon during the commission of a crime. (R., pp.151-54.) Subsequently, pursuant to
a mediated plea agreement, Mr. Foster agreed to plead guilty to two counts of attempted murder,
and one enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury, and the State agreed to dismiss the other
enhancements. (R., pp.182-94; Tr., p.87, L.9-p.95, L.7.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose the
maximum sentences allowed: two consecutive sentences of 15 years for the two counts of
attempted murder, and a consecutive sentence of20 years for the enhancement. (Tr., p.211, L.13
- p.212, L.8.) Mr. Foster's attorney asked that the district court consider Mr. Foster's mental
illness and recommended that the court impose a sentence of 30 years, with 10 years fixed.
(Tr., p.221, Ls.8-19.) The district court said it was considering "the fact that" Mr. Foster was
"obviously ... acting under delusions," but nevertheless imposed two consecutive sentences of
25 years, each with 12.5 years fixed. (Tr., p.231, L.9 - p.232, L.12; R., pp.243-45.) Mr. Foster
filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.253-55.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed two consecutive sentences of 25 years,
with 12.5 years fixed, following Mr. Foster's pleas of guilty to two counts of attempted murder
and an enhancement for the infliction of great bodily injury?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Two Consecutive Sentences Of 25
Years, With 12.5 Years Fixed, Following Mr. Foster's Pleas Of Guilty To Two Counts Of
Attempted Murder And An Enhancement For The Infliction Of Great Bodily Injury
Given the facts of this case, Mr. Foster's two consecutive sentences of 25 years, each
with 12.5 years fixed, are excessive because they are not necessary to achieve the goals of
sentencing. When there is a claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, this
Court will conduct "an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of
the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." State v.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8 (2016). In such a review, the Court "considers the entire length of the
sentence under an abuse of discretion standard." Id. An appellate court conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry when an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal. It considers whether the trial court
"( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun
Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
The fourth factor is the most important for sentencing purposes, and the one that is absent
in this case. "When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, 'the most fundamental
requirement is reasonableness."' McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)). Unless it appears that the length of the sentence is "necessary to accomplish
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution," the sentence is unreasonable. Id. When a sentence is
excessive "considering any view of the facts," because it is not necessary to achieve these goals,
it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
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There are multiple mitigating factors that illustrate why Mr. Foster’s sentences are
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. First, he clearly suffered with a severe and
debilitating mental illness that went untreated for years. That illness ultimately resulted in the
tragic acts on the day in question because he finally acted on his delusions. A defendant’s
mental illness has long been recognized as a mitigating factor. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384,
391 (1994) (“Idaho Code § 19–2523, which requires that the trial court consider the defendant's
mental illness as a sentencing factor, was an integral part of the legislature’s repeal of mental
condition as a defense.”). I.C. §19-2523(1) requires that sentencing courts consider, among other
things, the extent of a defendant’s mental illness, the “level of functional impairment” due to the
illness, and the defendant’s capacity to “appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of offense charged.”
In this case, the record makes it abundantly clear that Mr. Foster’s illness was so acute
that it affected his ability to function and dramatically affected his capacity to understand the
wrongful nature of his actions or conform his actions to the requirements of the law. When he
was hospitalized with gunshot wounds, Mr. Foster stated he believed he was involved in a “do or
die situation,” and “Bernie Sanders and Steven Seagall instructed him to fight.” (PSI, p.207.)
He also told the examining physician he had been “attacked by the ‘mafia’ for at least the last 510 years.”

(PSI, p.207.)

Several days later, the physician reported that Mr. Foster was

experiencing consistent paranoid delusions. (PSI, pp.211.) The physician also reported that
Mr. Foster said he had been aggressive towards one of his nurses because he thought the nurse
was “a member of the Nazi party.”

(PSI, p.213.)

Finally, he stated that Mr. Foster

“demonstrates situations in which paranoia is prevalent across a significant time frame as well as
involving multiple unrelated persons and events.” (PSI, p.214.)
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When he was first examined by Dr. Hanger, Mr. Foster said he had spoken with Bernie
Sanders on the phone, and Mr. Sanders had told him that the people who were coming to his
house were “not cops,” and therefore he needed to “fight for his life.” (PSI, p.44.) He also said
he believed the deputies “were there to harm me and my family.” (PSI, p.44.) After the
examination, Dr. Hanger concluded that Mr. Foster suffered with an unspecified psychotic
disorder, and opined it was a “probable Schizoaffective Disorder.” (PSI, p.47.) During a
subsequent examination six weeks later, when Mr. Foster was asked if he had been receiving
psychotropic medication, he said he thought so but then said, “The nurse is evil – she scares me –
this stuff is classified, I can’t talk about it – I think she’s a vampire – she needs a transfusion.”
(PSI, p.58.) When asked to explain his references to the Mafia in his recorded phone calls to his
mother, he said, “There’s Mafia people and there’s cops – they’re in it together. I feel if I talk
about it, they might give me more of a sentence.” (PSI, p.58.) When Dr. Hanger asked how he
got involved with the Mafia, Mr. Foster said, “I pissed off someone’s kid in high school – [his]
dad was powerful.” (PSI, p.58.) He went on to say that he owned a handgun that Clint
Eastwood previously owned, and said, “Everyone is trying to get it from me – Mafia people were
asking me.” (PSI, p.58.) In sum, the interviews with Mr. Foster dramatically illustrate the
severity and depth of his illness when he was not on medication.
Additionally, where Mr. Foster at first expressed remorse for his actions during periods
where he could comprehend the reality of what he had done, he showed no signs of remorse just
days later. (PSI, p.210.) These kinds of inconsistencies were prevalent throughout Mr. Foster’s
initial incarceration; occasionally he seemed to be able to accurately perceive reality, and yet
most of the time he clearly believed his delusions were real. Indeed, the record reveals that
Mr. Foster was battling a persistent and ongoing problem with his perceptions of reality because,
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while he had moments of lucidity, it is clear that, for the vast majority of the time, his delusions
dramatically affected his ability to process information. For example, in some of the phone calls
he made to his mother, he said some things that legitimately related to his case. He discussed
hiring another attorney if he was not satisfied with his current attorney, and he asked his mother
to try to get letters of reference for him. (PSI, p.56.) But on the same day he made that request,
he told his mother he believed he had been charged with rape, and the judge had told him that he
had raped his mother and grandmother. (PSI, p.56)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Foster tried to explain this conflicted thought pattern. He
acknowledged that, due to his fears, he began carrying a gun. (Tr., p.223, Ls.21-22.) He said
when he first saw the deputies pull into the driveway, he initially had “every intention to
surrender,” and he was “even relieved to finally take care of the misdemeanor warrant.”
(Tr., p.224, Ls.6-12.) However, he said, “I changed my mind to surrender when I heard them say
I was under arrest for being a Mexican in North Idaho and things my ancestors did.” (Tr., p.224,
Ls.13-15.) He said, “I heard them call off a long list of absurd charges and say that I was going
to take a punishment and that they were going to harm me and take my testicles.” (Tr., p.224,
Ls.15-18.) Thus, while he apparently initially comprehended the deputies were legitimate, his
delusions took over and made him believe they were not “real officers,” and this caused him to
“fear for [his] life” and take the actions that he did. (Tr., p.224, Ls.19-22.)
Once he was consistently taking effective medication, however, Dr. Hanger testified that
he was “stable with his ability to process information.” (Tr., p.193, Ls.22-23.) Additionally, he
explained that Mr. Foster’s level of functioning was “mildly impaired,” whereas without the
medication, he had observed “a moderate to severe level of impairment” in Mr. Foster.
(Tr., p.194, Ls.10-16.) He also testified that he had not seen any indication that Mr. Foster had
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been "non-compliant" with respect to taking his medication, and he commented that Mr. Foster
had actually said he had been feeling "more comfortable" and "calmer" on the medication that
proved to be the most effective for him.

(Tr., p.195, Ls.11-16.)

Dr. Hanger did say that

Mr. Foster needed some supervision to ensure he was taking his medication, but that such
supervision combined with counseling would ultimately help him to be able to "recognize the
patterns and hopefully minimize his tendency to either discontinue his medication management
or to decrease risks that might escalate." (Tr., p.195, L.19 - p.196, L.20.)
Additionally, after Mr. Foster was properly medicated and able to fully comprehend the
gravity of his acts, his acceptance of responsibility, and his expressions of remorse were sincere
and detailed. He said he was sorry for what he had done and he took "full responsibility" for his
actions.

(Tr., p.226, Ls.2-5.)

He also read a letter he had written to the officers. 3

He

acknowledged that he was not an articulate writer but asked everyone in the courtroom to "bear
with" him as he read "through this much needed apology." (Tr., p.226, Ls.15-20.) He explained
that it was difficult for him to understand what happened, but he said, "with the help of
medication," he was able to "take full responsibility for my horrible and almost fatal actions."
(Tr., p.226, L.21 - p.227, L.1.) He said, "I in no way ever wanted to hurt anyone, especially
Officer Gagnon and Officer Penn. I don't think I will be able to express the remorse and fear of
what transpired that day. I am very sorry for all the wreckage and physical damage that I caused
to both of these good men, the emotional trauma and the psychological damage caused to them
both and their families and loved ones." (Tr., p.227, Ls.1-8.) And he went on to say that he felt
"horrible now every waking moment of [his] life ... for that day." (Tr., p.227, Ls.10-11.)

3

Mr. Foster's letter is included in the Clerk's Record also. (R., pp.234-38.)
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Mr. Foster also said, “I know now that these officers were only at my home that day to do
their jobs and nothing more. But due to my illness, I acted out of fear, and I am truly sorry.”
(Tr., p.227, Ls.12-15.) He apologized for “being so long-winded,” but said there were “a million
apologies” he wanted to convey to the deputies and their families. (Tr., p.228, Ls.1-3.) And
finally he said he hoped the healing had begun for the victims, and he was trying to heal as well
by managing his illness. (Tr., p.228, Ls.6-9.) Mr. Foster’s genuine acceptance of responsibility
and expressions of remorse should have also been considered as mitigating information. See
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing the defendant’s sentence, in part, because
“the defendant has accepted responsibility for his acts”); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that some leniency was required, in part, because the defendant expressed
“remorse for his conduct”).
Additionally, these offenses were Mr. Foster’s first felony charges of any kind. (PSI,
pp.97-98.) This is also a long-recognized mitigating factor. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91
(1982) (reducing sentence where present conviction “was the defendant’s first felony with no
prior history of any sexual violations”); State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953) (“The courts
have long recognized that the first offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the
habitual criminal. In addition to considerations of humanity, justice and mercy, the object is to
encourage and foster the rehabilitation of one who has for the first time fallen into error, and
whose character for crime has not become fixed.”), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)).
As the district court acknowledged, Mr. Foster’s actions were the result of his delusions.
(Tr., p.231, Ls.9-11.)

Indeed, Mr. Foster’s mental illness made it impossible for him to

distinguish reality from delusion, to understand the wrongful nature of his actions, and to follow
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the law. There is no question that the deputies involved in this case endured horrible injuries,
and their families were dramatically affected as a result of Mr. Foster's actions. However, in
light of Mr. Foster's severe mental illness as well as the other mitigating factors in this case,
Mr. Foster's sentences were excessive and unreasonable because they were not necessary to
achieve the goals of sentencing. As Dr. Hanger testified, with the proper long-term medication
and counseling, Mr. Foster will be able to function with only a mild level of impairment going
forward. Thus, he would not pose a long-term risk to society after a period of incarceration
where he could be supervised. And, given that he made such good progress even by the time of
the sentencing hearing, a 25-year fixed period of incarceration is not necessary for this process to
be successful. A shorter fixed term would also provide stronger motivation for Mr. Foster to
aggressively pursue his rehabilitation while still ensuring there is significant retribution and
deterrence in this case. The district court, however, did not adequately consider this information
in deciding on an appropriate sentence. Similarly, it did not adequately consider all of the strong
mitigating information in this case. Therefore, it abused its discretion because it did not reach its
sentencing decision through an exercise of reason.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Foster respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 12th day of August, 2019.

/ s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of August, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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